This is a guest contribution by Beate van Loo-Born, Founder of BvLB Advisory and former UBS executive
I have been working on this since before it had a name. My first thesis, on eco-industrial development, was written in 2003, a year before the UN Global Compact’s Who Cares Wins report supplied the acronym ESG. Industrial ecology asks how to design a system so that one actor’s waste becomes another’s input. It is about closing loops and aligning incentives, which is what sustainability ought to mean, rather than the art of persuading people to behave better.
Twenty-three years on, the field has far more vocabulary but still very little feedback. I spent most of those decades in executive roles in financial services, at UBS and then at the Swiss stock exchange, before becoming chief operating officer of a philanthropically funded climate data organisation backed by two large climate foundations. I did and do believe in the mission. But we were flying blind in a dysfunctional system.
I moved from there into manufacturing. In finance and in manufacturing alike I never had to wonder whether a product was useful. Customers renewed or they left, revenue held or it fell. Where markets move slowly and products last decades that verdict takes years rather than quarters, but you receive the feedback eventually.
Climate philanthropy is spending six billion dollars a year on theories largely untested, given to organisations that do not close when they fail. The sector has yet to build the machinery that markets in the real economy use for recalibration and consolidation as a matter of course. The system is dysfunctional, which is a design failure rather than a moral dilemma. There are five failures, set out below, and five remedies that are already well established in other sectors.
Five Failures
1. User-buyer split
In a market the person who uses a product also pays for it, which is how a user’s opinion acquires force over a producer. When the thing stops being useful the money stops, and the producer has to find out why.
Philanthropy splits the two. The organisation I worked for produced analysis of corporate climate performance meant to inform lending and investment decisions. Its intended users were banks and investors. Its payers were foundations. A great many organisations in this sector are built to that shape, and none charges the people it is designed to serve.
Clients of these organisations often do not come looking for the product, because it exists to change how they behave rather than to help them get better at what they are already doing. That makes willingness to pay a weak test of whether it works.
Take the case above. An investor is trying to earn a return, not to cut emissions. Offered climate data for free they will take it, but impact is only created if they act on it, and an investment process draws on a great many data points, most of them there to optimise for alpha.
So the funder learns neither that the product is any good nor that the target has been reached. Climate impact is also a shared target of the entire sector, so any single organisation’s effect on the whole problem is diluted further still.
Climate is what Rittel and Webber called a wicked problem in 1973: no definitive formulation, no stopping rule, no clear owner, and no immediate or ultimate test of a solution. That last property has become the sector’s standing defence. If the problem admits no final verdict, the argument runs, asking for evidence of impact is naive.
It is a real difficulty and a poor excuse. The absence of a final verdict does not rule out an interim one. An investor either uses the data or does not. A bill either gets introduced or it does not. Wickedness explains why this sector cannot measure its ultimate effect on the climate. It does not explain why it declines to measure the steps in between.
2. The No-Exit-Curse
If you are not running a business, you cannot go out of business. A firm that cannot fund itself runs out of money, and its people, data and equipment are released back into the economy. Some see this as an unfortunate by-product of capitalism, but it is most of what makes a market economy intelligent, and philanthropy has no substitute for it.
Roughly half of new American businesses are gone within five years, and every one of those closures frees people and resources for a more productive venture. Nonprofits close too, but they close when a funder changes its mind, which is a verdict on a relationship rather than on results.
Nothing in this sector dies on the grounds of not working. I went looking for a counterexample and could not find a climate organisation that closed saying its theory of change had been tested and had failed. Plenty closed for other reasons. The Net Zero Banking Alliance ceased operations in October 2025 after its members left under political pressure. Climate Generation closed in February 2026, describing twenty years of meaningful impact on the way out.
Nor does hardship force consolidation. Bridgespan found nonprofit merger rates essentially unchanged between 2001 to 2006 and 2007 to 2012, because filings rose but registrations rose faster. The sector consolidated a little and proliferated more, through the worst financial crisis in seventy years.
Meanwhile money keeps entering and more organisations are founded each year. Bob counts six to seven thousand registered environmental NGOs in the United States alone, against six billion dollars of foundation climate funding worldwide in 2024. A global numerator against an American denominator gives roughly a million dollars each, and the real figure is lower. Funding has more than doubled since 2020 without producing fewer and larger organisations.
3. Competition without a price
Competition works when competitors are chasing the same person’s money and that person is the one being served, because the price then carries the answer back to everyone at once. Where the money comes from a funder there is no price at all, so working harder to win means working harder to impress the funder, which is not the same activity as working harder to be useful. Two organisations building substantially the same product are not a market discovering the better one.
Redundancy is genuine insurance, but only when somebody chose it. Nobody surveyed this field, concluded that four competing corporate assessment providers was the right number, and funded four. Unselected redundancy is not resilience but cost.
4. A conglomerate with no head office
Coordination took me longest to understand. I assumed that organisations sharing a cause would behave as collaborators who occasionally competed. Quite the contrary. There are countless collaboration meetings across the sector, spanning the traveling circus of COP and Climate Week, and very little real commitment or accountability to deliver anything together. How could there be, when nothing enforces either between organisations competing for the same funder?
Unlike a conglomerate, philanthropy has no head office. Each funder sees only its own portfolio, and the people who can see the duplication are the grantees sitting in those meetings, who have no standing to name it, because naming it means arguing that a neighbouring organisation should be defunded.
5. No theory of when it is wrong
The best objection is that philanthropy exists precisely to fund what has no price. Advocacy, litigation and movement building have no paying customer and no verdict for years, and they produced the sector’s biggest wins. Market discipline would have killed Beyond Coal in year three, and by 2020 that campaign had retired 318 of 530 US coal plants, double the goal set in 2011.
But nobody can say how much of that retirement Beyond Coal actually caused. Coal collapsed during the shale boom, and the two causes are not even independent, because the Sierra Club received more than 26 million dollars from sources connected to Chesapeake Energy while promoting gas as the replacement for coal. If attribution cannot be settled for the best-documented result the sector has, it can hardly be settled anywhere else.
The answer is not to measure everything. Unpriced does not mean unfalsifiable, and feedback is not the same thing as measurement. A litigation strategy has a docket, a movement has a membership count, an advocacy campaign has a bill number. What is missing is not metrics, of which there are already far too many, but any pre-committed statement of what would count as the theory having failed, and any actor with the standing to call it.
Why everyone is at COP - the veil of collaboration
One part of this system works, and it shows what the sector is capable of when a loop does close. Being seen by funders brings money, and money pays for the staff, the travel and the reports that get you seen again.
Senior people spend an extraordinary share of their time at climate conferences and the side events around them. Reading this as self-indulgence is mostly wrong. They go because visibility to funders is the closest thing this sector has to a sales channel, and because it is the only closed loop in the system. Energy flows to closed loops.
A company board sits on capital at risk, which gives it a selfish reason to want bad news early. In a philanthropically funded organisation the only stakeholder with real power is the funder, whose reputation is invested in the grantee succeeding. The escalation path for anyone raising a concern terminates at the party least motivated to hear the answer. A good enough cause also excuses a great deal, because work judged poor anywhere else survives when criticising it looks like criticising the mission.
Five Established Remedies
None of these needs inventing. All five have a track record in other sectors, and the first costs nothing.
1. A falsification condition
The precedent is the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory of 1986, which required factories to publish their hazardous emissions annually. No law against the emissions, no fines, no determination of safe levels, just information, and emissions fell forty percent by 1990. The philanthropic version is one sentence, published in advance, for each grant above a threshold, stating what would tell the funder the theory was wrong. For a data product aimed at investors: if by year three nobody can name a single investment decision that changed because of it, the theory was wrong. It is written by the funder rather than the grantee, so the burden falls on the party that currently carries none.
2. Balance sheet finance
Land that matters ecologically comes up for sale on the seller’s timetable. The public agency or land trust that should end up owning it cannot move at that speed, because appropriations and fundraising take years. The Conservation Fund borrows cheaply and buys it immediately, holds it, then sells it on to that permanent owner once their money is in place, and the capital returns for the next purchase. Forty years, more than 4,000 transactions, never a year in the red.
A grant is spent once. Capital that has to come back is spent repeatedly, and it stops coming back when the deals stop working, which is a verdict a grant never delivers.
3. Usage of advance market commitments
An advance market commitment is a promise to buy something that does not yet exist, at a guaranteed price, so that suppliers have a reason to build the capacity to make it. The device was invented for vaccines, where guaranteed purchases persuaded manufacturers to build capacity for countries that could not otherwise pay.
Frontier applies it to carbon removal and has committed 1.8 billion dollars through 2040. What matters here is not the size of the commitment but that Frontier publishes what it has contracted against what has actually been delivered, on a schedule anyone can watch. Philanthropy has the same gap, between what a grant was funded to achieve and what it achieved, and never calculates it.
4. Specific consolidation
Consolidation covers three separate moves.
Function first. Three organisations each assessing a thousand companies by three different methods produce three sets of data that cannot be laid side by side. A study of six major ESG raters, memorably titled Aggregate Confusion, found their ratings correlated at about 0.54, and that more than half of the disagreement came from measuring the same attribute in different ways. One organisation assessing three thousand companies by one method is worth more than the three combined, because comparability is what is useful for transparency. The commercial side has made steps in the right direction: S&P bought Trucost in 2016, and in 2019 MSCI bought Carbon Delta and Moody’s bought Four Twenty Seven. The philanthropically funded side pools data through coalitions and benchmarks, and every provider survives rather than merging.
The standard setters have meanwhile conceded the point. The Climate Disclosure Standards Board and the Value Reporting Foundation were asking companies for much the same information in different shapes, and in 2022 both were folded into the IFRS Foundation. They recognised they had created mismatched demands and consolidated to remove them. Europe kept its own standard, then cut its mandatory datapoints by more than half in 2026. The organisations collecting the data have yet to follow.
Funding second, meaning fewer, larger and longer commitments. A two-year grant does not merely provide less money than a five-year grant, it changes what the organisation does with its time, because an organisation eighteen months from the end of its funding is one whose senior people are fundraising rather than working. Ford Foundation tested this with a billion dollars of five-year grants from 2016, and 83 percent of the organisations funded reported being more financially resilient at the end than at the start
Organisations last, because mergers are slow and expensive, and because a sector of fewer and larger organisations depends on the judgement of fewer funders. When they do happen they can work: a study of 25 Chicago nonprofit mergers found 88 percent of the merged organisations felt stronger afterwards. Word of caution from the real economy: Consolidation is not a virtue in itself. Where two organisations are doing the same job, merge them; where they are not, leave them alone.
5. Professionalise the funder rather than only the grantee
Every remedy above lands on the grantee. This one is for the people writing the cheques. A profession has shared definitions, published methods, entry standards and consequences for failure. Climate funders have fragments of the first two and nothing of the last two. ClimateWorks, six annual editions into tracking the field, puts 2024 mitigation giving somewhere between 11.7 and 18.4 billion dollars, and reports that it still cannot separate general operating support from unrestricted funding because funders label them inconsistently. An accounting standard makes revenue mean the same thing at two companies. Nothing does that for a grant.
Development aid fixed this in 2008. The International Aid Transparency Initiative gives donors one format for reporting what they funded, for what, and what came of it; more than 1,500 organisations use it. Climate philanthropy could adopt it tomorrow. Bob and Shivaram Rajgopal argued in June that corporate sustainability officers need to behave like a profession. It applies with more force to funders, because no one else in this system can change it.
Ordinary Practice in the Real World
None of these mechanisms are exotic. In the commercial and financial economy they are ordinary practice, which is what made the return to manufacturing so striking after four years without them. A company finds out whether its product works because someone either buys it or does not. Failure releases people and capital to something with a better claim on them. Boards want bad news early, because their own money is at risk. Revenue means the same thing at two different companies, because accounting standards make it so, and that is the reason their performance can be compared at all.
Industrial ecology, the discipline I started in twenty-three years ago, exists because linear systems, the ones that take materials in, use them once and discard them, eventually run down however well-intentioned their operators are. The fix is never exhortation but designing the system to close the loop.
Climate philanthropy is a linear system. Money enters, organisations accumulate, and nothing is consumed, nothing is recycled, nothing dies.
The sector argues endlessly about where the money should go and never about whether the last allocation worked. One sentence from the funder, written before the cash is allocated, saying what would show the theory was wrong, would give this sector its first routine way of finding out.
The Author
Beate van Loo-Born is the founder of BvLB Advisory. She spent twenty years in executive roles in financial services, at UBS and then at the Swiss stock exchange, before becoming chief operating officer of a philanthropically funded climate data organisation backed by two large climate foundations. She has since held executive roles in manufacturing.
She holds a MA in Sustainability Leadership from the University of Cambridge, where Robert Eccles was her thesis advisor, and wrote her first thesis, on eco-industrial development, in 2003 for an MBA at Clark. She holds an MA from the Sorbonne, an Executive MBA in Finance, and is conducting doctoral research on dysfunctional ecosystems at the University of Antwerp.





We were recently rejected by Allen Philanthropies, a major U.S. climate funder, to test whether the carbon offset market could be used to conserve old-growth forest. Our proposal stated clear, testable hypotheses. In the proposal we explained that the idea might fail for a variety of technical and financial reasons, and that reporting failure would be as important as documenting success. Maybe there were other reasons we were rejected, but we very explicitly set out to test a potential climate solution with science. All we got for 80 hours of proposal writing was “we wish you the best in your endeavors.” Rejection is the nature of our business, but a thoughtful explanation would be respectful, given the time we put into thinking it through and writing it. We are on the front lines of climate change. We at least deserve a thoughtful couple of sentences in a rejection. (We had already successfully passed the Letter of Intent phase earlier in the year.) To the author’s point, this example is a disincentive for writing proposals that rigorously test hypotheses (ideas).
A fascinating piece, Beate. Your distinction between trying to persuade people to behave better and designing systems that produce better outcomes particularly resonated with me.
We’ve reached a similar conclusion in our work on Responsible Business 2.0.
Personal responsibility matters. Values matter. Leadership matters. But we cannot simply exhort people to behave responsibly if the systems, incentives, governance and culture around them encourage something different.
That is why we’ve increasingly focused on the organisational “operating system” that shapes everyday behaviour and decision-making.
Perhaps the challenge is not simply how do we encourage responsible behaviour?
It is how do we design organisations in which responsible behaviour becomes the natural outcome of how the system works?
Really thought-provoking article.